Covert Channel Between the CPU and An FPGA By Modulating The Usage of the Power Distribution Network


A new technical paper titled "CPU to FPGA Power Covert Channel in FPGA-SoCs" was published by researchers at TU Munich and Fraunhofer Research Institution AISEC. Abstract: "FPGA-SoCs are a popular platform for accelerating a wide range of applications due to their performance and flexibility. From a security point of view, these systems have been shown to be vulnerable to various attacks... » read more

Hardware Based Monitoring For Zero Trust Environments


A technical paper titled "Towards Hardware-Based Application Fingerprinting with Microarchitectural Signals for Zero Trust Environments" was published by the Air Force Institute of Technology. Abstract "The interactions between software and hardware are increasingly important to computer system security. This research collects sequences of microprocessor control signals to develop machine ... » read more

Logic Locking at the RTL, Leveraging The Behavioral State Transition Coding For Obfuscation (University of Florida)


A new technical paper titled "ReTrustFSM: Toward RTL Hardware Obfuscation-A Hybrid FSM Approach" was published by researchers at University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Abstract: "Hardware obfuscating is a proactive design-for-trust technique against IC supply chain threats, i.e., IP piracy and overproduction. Many studies have evaluated numerous techniques for obfuscation purposes. Neverth... » read more

Hardware-Based Confidential Computing (NIST)


NIST has published a draft report, titled “Hardware Enabled Security: Hardware-Based Confidential Computing,” which presents an approach for managing machine identities for protection against malware and other security vulnerabilities. Comments are due April 10, 2023. Abstract "Organizations employ a growing volume of machine identities, often numbering in the thousands or millions per ... » read more

Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks And Defenses On Non-Volatile RAM


A new technical paper titled "NVLeak: Off-Chip Side-Channel Attacks via Non-Volatile Memory Systems" was written (preprint) by researchers at UC San Diego, UT Austin, and Purdue University. Abstract "We study microarchitectural side-channel attacks and defenses on non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) DIMMs. In this study, we first perform reverse-engineering of NVRAMs as implemented by the Intel Optane... » read more

Review of Methods to Design Secure Memristor Computing Systems


A technical paper titled "Review of security techniques for memristor computing systems" was published by researchers at Israel Institute of Technology, Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany), and Leibniz Institute of Photonic Technology (IPHT). Abstract "Neural network (NN) algorithms have become the dominant tool in visual object recognition, natural language processing, and robotic... » read more

Security-Aware Compiler-Assisted Countermeasure to Mitigate Fault Attacks on RISC-V


A new technical paper titled "CompaSeC: A Compiler-Assisted Security Countermeasure to Address Instruction Skip Fault Attacks on RISC-V" was published by researchers at TU Munich and Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security (AISEC). Abstract "Fault-injection attacks are a risk for any computing system executing security-relevant tasks, such as a secure boot process. While ha... » read more

Formal Processor Model Providing Secure Speculation For The Constant-Time Policy


A technical paper titled "ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy (Extended version)" was published by researchers at imec-DistriNet at KU Leuven, CEA, List, Université Paris Saclay and INRIA. Abstract: "We propose ProSpeCT, a generic formal processor model providing provably secure speculation for the constant-time policy. For constant-time programs under a no... » read more

HW-SW Co-Design Solution For Building Side-Channel-Protected ML Hardware


A technical paper titled "Hardware-Software Co-design for Side-Channel Protected Neural Network Inference" was published (preprint) by researchers at North Carolina State University and Intel. Abstract "Physical side-channel attacks are a major threat to stealing confidential data from devices. There has been a recent surge in such attacks on edge machine learning (ML) hardware to extract the... » read more

Detecting Hardware Trojans In a RISC-V Core’s Post-Layout Phase


A new technical paper "Trojan-D2: Post-Layout Design and Detection of Stealthy Hardware Trojans - A RISC-V Case Study" was published by researchers at University of Bremen, DFKI GmbH, and the German Aerospace Center. Abstract: "With the exponential increase in the popularity of the RISC-V ecosystem, the security of this platform must be re-evaluated especially for mission-critical and IoT d... » read more

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