Multi-Party Computation for Securing Chiplets


A new technical paper titled "Garblet: Multi-party Computation for Protecting Chiplet-based Systems" was published by Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Abstract "The introduction of shared computation architectures assembled from heterogeneous chiplets introduces new security threats. Due to the shared logical and physical resources, an untrusted chiplet can act maliciously to surreptitiousl... » read more

Silicon Reimagined: New Foundations For The Age of AI


The semiconductor industry is undergoing a pivotal transformation driven by the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and the slowing of traditional Moore’s Law scaling.  In this comprehensive 42 page report, several key trends shaping the industry’s future are highlighted. The push toward more specialized architectures tailored for specific workloads, particularly in AI. The critic... » read more

Solution To Read Disturbance For Current And Future DRAM Chips at Low Area, Performance And Energy Costs (ETH Zurich et al.)


A new technical paper titled "Chronus: Understanding and Securing the Cutting-Edge Industry Solutions to DRAM Read Disturbance" was published by researchers at ETH Zurich, TOBB, and University of Sharjah. Abstract "We 1) present the first rigorous security, performance, energy, and cost analyses of the state-of-the-art on-DRAM-die read disturbance mitigation method, Per Row Activation Count... » read more

SW-HW Co-Design Mitigation To Strengthen ASLR Against Microarchitectural Attacks (MIT)


A technical paper titled "Oreo: Protecting ASLR Against Microarchitectural Attacks" was published by researchers at MIT. Abstract "Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is one of the most prominently deployed mitigations against memory corruption attacks. ASLR randomly shuffles program virtual addresses to prevent attackers from knowing the location of program contents in memory. Microa... » read more

Temporal Variation in DRAM Read Disturbance in DDR4 and HBM2 (ETH Zurich, Rutgers)


A new technical paper titled "Variable Read Disturbance: An Experimental Analysis of Temporal Variation in DRAM Read Disturbance" was published by researchers at ETH Zurich and Rutgers University. Abstract "Modern DRAM chips are subject to read disturbance errors. State-of-the-art read disturbance mitigations rely on accurate and exhaustive characterization of the read disturbance threshold... » read more

Rowhammer Mitigation With Adaptive Refresh Management Optimization (KAIST, Sk hynix)


A new technical paper titled "Securing DRAM at Scale: ARFM-Driven Row Hammer Defense with Unveiling the Threat of Short tRC Patterns" was published by researchers at KAIST and Sk hynix. Abstract (partial) "To address the issue of powerful row hammer (RH) attacks, our study involved an extensive analysis of the prevalent attack patterns in the field. We discovered a strong correlation betwee... » read more

HW Security: Pager, Walkie-talkie And Other Battery-Power System Attacks (U. of Florida)


A new technical paper titled "When Everyday Devices Become Weapons: A Closer Look at the Pager and Walkie-talkie Attacks" was published by researchers at University of Florida. Abstract "Battery-powered technologies like pagers and walkie-talkies have long been integral to civilian and military operations. However, the potential for such everyday devices to be weaponized has largely been un... » read more

Apple CPU Attacks: SLAP and FLOP (Georgia Tech, Ruhr University Bochum)


Two technical papers were published by researchers at Georgia Tech and Ruhr University Bochum detailing CPU side-channel attack vulnerabilities on Apple devices that could reveal confidential data. FLOP: Breaking the Apple M3 CPU via False Load Output Predictions"  Authors: Jason Kim, Jalen Chuang, Daniel Genkin and Yuval Yarom 2025. "We present FLOP, another speculative execution att... » read more

Reverse Engineering Approach for Evaluating HW IP Protection ( U. of Florida, Indiana U.)


A technical paper titled "Library-Attack: Reverse Engineering Approach for Evaluating Hardware IP Protection" was published by researchers at University of Florida and Indiana University. Abstract "Existing countermeasures for hardware IP protection, such as obfuscation, camouflaging, and redaction, aim to defend against confidentiality and integrity attacks. However, within the current thr... » read more

Fully Partitioned Security Monitoring Logic From Both The CPU’s Main Core and Privileged SW (KAIST)


A new technical paper titled "Interstellar: Fully Partitioned and Efficient Security Monitoring Hardware Near a Processor Core for Protecting Systems against Attacks on Privileged Software" was published by researchers at KAIST. The paper states "The existing approaches to instruction trace-based security monitoring hardware are dependent on the privileged software, which presents a signific... » read more

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