Attestation Scheme Monitoring The Prover Using Hardware Security Module Connected To Its System Bus (Oxford)


A technical paper titled “Hardware-assisted remote attestation design for critical embedded systems” was published by researchers at University of Oxford.

Abstract (excerpt)
“To reveal attack scenarios exploiting the memory regions and time windows left unattested, we propose an attestation scheme that can continuously monitor both static and dynamic memory regions with better spatial and temporal attestation coverage. Our monitoring mechanism is designed to be performed in real time using a novel hardware security module (HSM) connected to the prover’s system bus. The proposed HSM monitors not only the integrity of the code on the prover but also its execution by checking the compliance of the bits seen on the bus according to a runtime integrity model (RIM) of the prover’s software. Therefore, our attestation scheme is capable of reporting scenarios that violate both the (static) code and (dynamic) runtime integrity since the deployment time.”

Find the technical paper here. Published March 2023.

Geden, Munir, and Kasper Rasmussen. “Hardware‐assisted remote attestation design for critical embedded systems.” IET Information Security (2023).

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