Home
TECHNICAL PAPERS

Review of Methods to Design Secure Memristor Computing Systems

popularity

A technical paper titled “Review of security techniques for memristor computing systems” was published by researchers at Israel Institute of Technology, Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany), and Leibniz Institute of Photonic Technology (IPHT).

Abstract
“Neural network (NN) algorithms have become the dominant tool in visual object recognition, natural language processing, and robotics. To enhance the computational efficiency of these algorithms, in comparison to the traditional von Neuman computing architectures, researchers have been focusing on memristor computing systems. A major drawback when using memristor computing systems today is that, in the artificial intelligence (AI) era, well-trained NN models are intellectual property and, when loaded in the memristor computing systems, face theft threats, especially when running in edge devices. An adversary may steal the well-trained NN models through advanced attacks such as learning attacks and side-channel analysis. In this paper, we review different security techniques for protecting memristor computing systems. Two threat models are described based on their assumptions regarding the adversary’s capabilities: a black-box (BB) model and a white-box (WB) model. We categorize the existing security techniques into five classes in the context of these threat models: thwarting learning attacks (BB), thwarting side-channel attacks (BB), NN model encryption (WB), NN weight transformation (WB), and fingerprint embedding (WB). We also present a cross-comparison of the limitations of the security techniques. This paper could serve as an aid when designing secure memristor computing systems.”

Find the technical paper here. Published December 2022.

Zou, Minhui, Nan Du, and Shahar Kvatinsky. “Review of security techniques for memristor computing systems.” Front. Electron. Mater, 19 December 2022
Sec. Semiconducting Materials and Devices
Volume 2 – 2022 | https://doi.org/10.3389/femat.2022.1010613



Leave a Reply


(Note: This name will be displayed publicly)