Hertzbleed: Prime Time For Power Side Channel Countermeasures Or Novelty Attack?

Hertzbleed is a new side-channel attack that turns a power side channel into a timing side channel. That timing side channel may be exploitable even if the algorithm runs in a constant number of clock cycles. The novel observation is that the duration of a clock cycle can vary depending on the data processed on a CPU that uses dynamic frequency scaling. This allows a remote attacker to extract... » read more

Hertzbleed: A New Family of Side-Channel Attacks–Root Case: Dynamic Frequency Scaling

  New research paper titled "Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86" from researchers at UT Austin, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) and University of Washington can be found here. (preprint). This paper will be presented at the 31st USENIX Security Symposium (Boston, 10–12 August 2022). Summary explanation of the Hertzbleed ... » read more

Mixed Messages For Mixed-Signal

There is no such thing as a purely digital design at advanced nodes today. Even designs that have no [getkc id="37" kc_name="analog"] content are likely relying on [getkc id="38" kc_name="mixed-signal"] components such as SerDes for communications, or voltage regulators for adaptive power control. But the days of purposely attempting to integrate everything including analog and RF onto a single... » read more