Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis


A technical paper titled "On the Feasibility of Malware Unpacking via Hardware-assisted Loop Profiling" was published by researches at Shandong University & Hubei Normal University, Tulane University and University of Texas at Arlington.  This paper was included at the recent 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. Abstract "Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) are built-in registers of modern... » read more

Transient Execution Attacks That Leaks Arbitrary Kernel Memory (ETH Zurich)


A technical paper titled “Inception: Exposing New Attack Surfaces with Training in Transient Execution” was published by researchers at ETH Zurich. Abstract: "To protect against transient control-flow hijacks, software relies on a secure state of microarchitectural buffers that are involved in branching decisions. To achieve this secure state, hardware and software mitigations restrict or... » read more

Side-Channel Security Analysis of Intel Optane Persistent Memory


A new technical paper titled "Side-Channel Attacks on Optane Persistent Memory" was published by researchers at University of Virginia, Cornell University, and Graz University of Technology. This paper was included at the recent 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. Abstract: "There is a constant evolution of technology for cloud environments, including the development of new memory storage tech... » read more

Modeling and Testing Microarchitectural Leakage of CPU Exceptions (Microsoft, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)


A new technical paper titled "Speculation at Fault: Modeling and Testing Microarchitectural Leakage of CPU Exceptions" was published by researchers at Microsoft and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. This paper was included at the recent 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. Abstract: "Microarchitectural leakage models provide effective tools to prevent vulnerabilities such as Spectre and Meltdown vi... » read more

Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks And Defenses on NVRAM DIMMs


A new technical paper titled "NVLeak: Off-Chip Side-Channel Attacks via Non-Volatile Memory Systems" was published by researchers at UC San Diego, Purdue University, and UT Austin. This paper was included at the recent 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. Abstract: "We study microarchitectural side-channel attacks and defenses on non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) DIMMs. In this study, we first perform r... » read more

Formal Processor Model Providing Provably Secure Speculation For The Constant-Time Policy


A new technical paper titled "ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy" was published by researchers at imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, CEA, and INRIA. This paper was included at the recent 32nd USENIX Security Symposium. Abstract: "We propose ProSpeCT, a generic formal processor model providing provably secure speculation for the constant-time policy. For constant-tim... » read more

How Attackers Can Read Data From CPU’s Memory By Analyzing Energy Consumption


A technical paper titled “Collide+Power: Leaking Inaccessible Data with Software-based Power Side Channels” was published by researchers at Graz University of Technology and CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security. Abstract: "Differential Power Analysis (DPA) measures single-bit differences between data values used in computer systems by statistical analysis of power traces. In th... » read more

Programmable HW Accelerators For BGV Fully Homomorphic Encryption In The Cloud


A technical paper titled “BASALISC: Programmable Hardware Accelerator for BGV Fully Homomorphic Encryption” was published by researchers at COSIC KU Leuven, Galois Inc., and Niobium Microsystems. Abstract: "Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows for secure computation on encrypted data. Unfortunately, huge memory size, computational cost and bandwidth requirements limit its practic... » read more

Heat-Tolerant CNT-Based PUFs


A technical paper titled “CNT-PUFs: Highly Robust and Heat-Tolerant Carbon-Nanotube-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Stable Key Generation” was published by researchers at Chemnitz University of Technology, University of Passau, Technical University of Darmstadt, and Fraunhofer Institute for Electronic Nano Systems (ENAS). Abstract: "In this work, we explore a highly robust and... » read more

NoC Obfuscation For Protecting Against Reverse Engineering Attacks (U. Of Florida)


A technical paper titled "ObNoCs: Protecting Network-on-Chip Fabrics Against Reverse-Engineering Attacks" was published by researchers at University of Florida. Abstract: "Modern System-on-Chip designs typically use Network-on-Chip (NoC) fabrics to implement coordination among integrated hardware blocks. An important class of security vulnerabilities involves a rogue foundry reverse-engineeri... » read more

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