How To Stop Row Hammer Attacks


Row hammer is a well-publicized target for cyberattacks on DRAM, and there have been attempts to stop these attacks in DDR4 and DDR5, but with mixed results. The problem is that as density increases, distance decreases, making it more likely that flipped bit cell in one row can disturb a bit cell in another, and that bits flipped across an entire row can flip another row. Steven Woo, fellow and... » read more

Challenges And Innovations Of HW Security And Trust For Chiplet-Based 2.5D and 3D ICs


A technical paper titled “On hardware security and trust for chiplet-based 2.5D and 3D ICs: Challenges and Innovations” was published by researchers at STMicroelectronics Crolles (ST-CROLLES), Département Systèmes et Circuits Intégrés Numériques (DSCIN), Techniques de l'Informatique et de la Microélectronique pour l'Architecture des systèmes intégrés (TIMA), and Laboratoire Systèm... » read more

SystemC-based Power Side-Channel Attacks Against AI Accelerators (Univ. of Lubeck)


A new technical paper titled "SystemC Model of Power Side-Channel Attacks Against AI Accelerators: Superstition or not?" was published by researchers at Germany's University of Lubeck. Abstract "As training artificial intelligence (AI) models is a lengthy and hence costly process, leakage of such a model's internal parameters is highly undesirable. In the case of AI accelerators, side-chann... » read more

Nanoscale Reconfigurable Si Transistors (TU Wien, CNRS, UNC)


A new technical paper titled "Nanoscale Reconfigurable Si Transistors: From Wires to Sheets and Unto Multi-Wire Channels" was published by researchers at TU Wien, CNRS, and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Abstract: "In this work, bottom-up Al–Si–Al nanowire (NW) heterostructures are presented, which act as a prototype vehicle toward top-down fabricated nanosheet (NS) and ... » read more

Hardware-Based Methodology To Protect AI Accelerators


A technical paper titled “A Unified Hardware-based Threat Detector for AI Accelerators” was published by researchers at Nanyang Technological University and Tsinghua University. Abstract: "The proliferation of AI technology gives rise to a variety of security threats, which significantly compromise the confidentiality and integrity of AI models and applications. Existing software-based so... » read more

More Efficient Side-Channel Analysis By Applying Two Deep Feature Loss Functions


A technical paper titled “Beyond the Last Layer: Deep Feature Loss Functions in Side-channel Analysis” was published by researchers at Nanyang Technological University, Radboud University, and Delft University of Technology. Abstract: "This paper provides a novel perspective on improving the efficiency of side-channel analysis by applying two deep feature loss functions: Soft Nearest Neig... » read more

Hardware Fuzzing With MAB Algorithms


A technical paper titled “MABFuzz: Multi-Armed Bandit Algorithms for Fuzzing Processors” was published by researchers at Texas A&M University and Technische Universitat Darmstadt. Abstract: "As the complexities of processors keep increasing, the task of effectively verifying their integrity and security becomes ever more daunting. The intricate web of instructions, microarchitectural ... » read more

Analyzing The U.S. Advanced Packaging Ecosystem With Countermeasures To Mitigate HW Security Issues


A technical paper titled “US Microelectronics Packaging Ecosystem: Challenges and Opportunities” was published by researchers at University of Florida, University of Miami, and Skywater Technology Foundry. Abstract: "The semiconductor industry is experiencing a significant shift from traditional methods of shrinking devices and reducing costs. Chip designers actively seek new technologica... » read more

GNN-Based Pre-Silicon Power Side-Channel Analysis Framework At RTL Level


A technical paper titled “SCAR: Power Side-Channel Analysis at RTL-Level” was published by researchers at University of Texas at Dallas, Technology Innovation Institute and University of Illinois Chicago. Abstract: "Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary t... » read more

A Framework To Detect Capacitance-Based Analog Hardware Trojans And Mitigate The Effects


A technical paper titled “DeMiST: Detection and Mitigation of Stealthy Analog Hardware Trojans” was published by researchers at Tennessee Tech University and Technische Universitat Wien. Abstract: "The global semiconductor supply chain involves design and fabrication at various locations, which leads to multiple security vulnerabilities, e.g., Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Although most... » read more

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