Hertzbleed: Prime Time For Power Side Channel Countermeasures Or Novelty Attack?


Hertzbleed is a new side-channel attack that turns a power side channel into a timing side channel. That timing side channel may be exploitable even if the algorithm runs in a constant number of clock cycles. The novel observation is that the duration of a clock cycle can vary depending on the data processed on a CPU that uses dynamic frequency scaling. This allows a remote attacker to extract... » read more

Technical Paper Round-Up: July 5


New technical papers added to Semiconductor Engineering’s library this week. [table id=36 /] Semiconductor Engineering is in the process of building this library of research papers. Please send suggestions (via comments section below) for what else you’d like us to incorporate. If you have research papers you are trying to promote, we will review them to see if they are a good fit for... » read more

Hertzbleed: A New Family of Side-Channel Attacks–Root Case: Dynamic Frequency Scaling


  New research paper titled "Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86" from researchers at UT Austin, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) and University of Washington can be found here. (preprint). This paper will be presented at the 31st USENIX Security Symposium (Boston, 10–12 August 2022). Summary explanation of the Hertzbleed ... » read more